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I. INTRODUCTION
In Science Fiction, Earth is often threatened by a variety of space-
based enemies from evil robots to malevolent Martians. However, in
reality, the greatest barrier to America revitalizing its moribund com-
mercial space launch and manufacturing industries is none other than
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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the United States Government itself, a force that would leave even
Klingons weak with fear and dread.
Specifically, the obsolete and poorly enforced International Traffic
in Arms Regulations ("ITAR") have become an albatross around U.S.
companies' necks, stifling innovation and stunting development.'
The great irony is that, in stark contrast to U.S. export control's
twin policy goals of maintaining domestic preeminence in the aero-
space field and supporting national security, the ITAR is having ex-
actly the opposite effect. 2 Since 1999, when all space-related systems
were returned to the United States Munitions List ("USML"),
America's leadership in commercial space capabilities has eroded,
while Russian, European, and Asian entities have expanded and deep-
ened their growing dominance. 3
II. THE BIGELOW AEROSPACE STORY
For the past ten years, I have had the privilege to be associated in
one form or another with Bigelow Aerospace. Founded by the vision-
ary entrepreneur Robert T. Bigelow, the goal of Bigelow Aerospace is
to create a new, robust, private sector-driven space industry by dra-
matically reducing the costs of conducting space-based activities. The
exclusive focus of the company is developing next-generation space
habitats that utilize "expandable" technology.
1. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, BRIEFING OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON THE HEALTH OF THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND THE IMPACT
OF EXPORT CONTROLS 10 (2008), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080219-
spaceindustrialbasepowerpoint.pdf ("Finding 10: The U.S. share of the global
space markets is steadily declining, and U.S. companies are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to participate in foreign space markets. Finding 11: Export con-
trols are adversely affecting U.S. companies' ability to compete for foreign space
business, particularly in the 2nd and 3rd tier. And it is the 2nd/3rd tier of the
industry that is the source of much innovation, and is normally the most engaged
in the global market place in the aerospace/defense sector.") [hereinafter CSIS].
2. Id. at 8 ("Finding 6: The grand strategic intent of the space export controls is not
being achieved .... In some cases, the space export control policy is running
counter to the national space policy.").
3. Ryan Zelnio, The Effects of Export Control on the Space Industry, THE SPACE
REV., January 16, 2006, http://www.thespacereview.comarticle/533/1 ('Prior to
the change in export controls in 1999, the US dominated the commercial satellite-
manufacturing field with an average market share of 83 percent. Since that
time, market share has declined to 50 percent .... While this cannot be blamed
entirely on changes in export regulation, they have played a significant part in
the decline. However, since the change in export policy, no Chinese satellite op-
erator has chosen to purchase any satellite that is subject to US export regula-
tions and have instead selected European and Israeli suppliers with over six
satellite orders to date since 1999. This comes out to a loss estimated anywhere
from $1.5 to $3.0 billion to the US economy. Additionally, China has made a
commitment to building up their commercial satellite bus, the DFH-4 by the
China Academy of Space Technology. This bus has been successfully marketed to
other countries fearing US export policies, including Nigeria and Venezuela.").
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The idea of an expandable space habitat was first developed by
NASA in the early 1960s, 4 but the giant tire-like structures that were
envisioned at the time could never have survived in the harsh environ-
ment of space, and the concept was eventually dropped. However, de-
cades later, with the introduction of advanced flexible fabrics such as
Kevlar in the 1980s and 1990s, the idea of producing spacecraft that
could inflate/expand after reaching orbit was revisited. The benefits
of what NASA was then calling an "inflatable habitat" included re-
duced usage of rocket fairing volume (which saves money), decreased
mass (which also reduces costs), increased usable volume (after de-
ployment), and enhanced protection from radiation (a key issue for
long duration missions). Due to these advantages, NASA began a pro-
gram called "TransHab" to develop an inflatable habitat that would be
used as a crew quarters for the International Space Station. 5 Despite
the promising nature of the technology, the TransHab program was
canceled by Congress in 2000 due to political and budgetary concerns.
After the termination of the TransHab program and NASA aban-
doning an extraordinarily promising technology, Bigelow Aerospace
picked up the torch that the government had dropped and dedicated
itself to implementing the concept.
Unfortunately, NASA never got very far with the TransHab pro-
gram, and Bigelow Aerospace was forced to begin almost from scratch.
Under Robert Bigelow's personal direction, by 2002, the company had
crafted a bold plan to develop sub-scale pathfinder modules that
would demonstrate and validate this new technology in an actual, or-
bital environment.
To launch these trailblazing spacecraft, Bigelow Aerospace se-
lected ISC Kosmotras, a joint Russian-Ukrainian venture that con-
verts Russian SS-18 missiles (a critical part of the Russian nuclear
arsenal) into a commercial space launch vehicle known as the
"Dnepr." Kosmotras's business is literally a "swords into plowshares"
story. The strong capacity of the Dnepr was needed since the Bigelow
Aerospace pathfinders, the first of which was dubbed Genesis I, are
substantial spacecraft, each more than fourteen feet (4.4 meters) in
length with an eight foot (2.4 meters) diameter (post deployment) and
a weight of nearly 3,000 lbs.
Previously, Dnepr launches had taken place from Baikonur, Rus-
sia's primary commercial space launch facility located in Kazakhstan.
However, for a variety of reasons, the Genesis I launch was shifted to
4. The work was performed by the Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, and while never
launched, some rudimentary and preliminary production models were created.
See Inflatable Station Concept, http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/ABSTRACTS/GPN-2003-
00106.html (last visited July 25, 2008).
5. See National Aeronautics and Space Administration, TransHab Concept, http://
spaceflight.nasa.gov/history/station/transhab/ (last visited July 25, 2008).
2008]
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an active Russian nuclear missile base near the town of Yasny in the
Orenburg region of Russia. Genesis I was the first commercial launch
in the history of Yasny, and it was also the first time that the Dnepr
would carry a single, large integrated payload. The launch occurred
on July 12, 2006, and was a stunning success. The following year, on
June 28, 2007, Genesis II was successfully launched, also on a Dnepr
from what is now known as the Yasny Space and Missile Complex.
Both launches exceeded Bigelow Aerospace's expectations, and the
two spacecraft successfully validated Bigelow Aerospace's fundamen-
tal engineering concepts. Genesis I and Genesis II both remain in or-
bit today and continue to produce invaluable data.
However, what Bigelow Aerospace learned during the Genesis I
and II programs was that while the technical challenges were difficult,
they paled before the bureaucratic and political obstacles posed by the
U.S.'s irrational export control regime. Second only to gravity, it was
the ITAR that had the best chance of preventing Genesis I and II from
leaving the Earth.
III. ADVENTURES IN EXPORT CONTROL, THE
GENESIS I AND II CAMPAIGNS
Apparently, the First Amendment guarantee of Freedom of Speech
disappears the minute Americans travel across the Atlantic. In order
to share even the most rudimentary information about potential
spacecraft, such as mass and general dimensions, aerospace compa-
nies must first go through a gauntlet of applications, licenses, and
bureaucracy.
Specifically, one must begin by filing a Technical Assistance Agree-
ment ("TAA"). The TAA is a broad general document describing what
kind of collaboration will take place, the type of information that will
be shared, and who the foreign parties are. Drafting a TAA can take
anywhere from a month to half a year (depending upon the complexity
of the project) and is submitted to the Department of State's Director-
ate of Defense Trade Controls ("DDTC"). Depending on their backlog
and the nature of the TAA, it usually takes anywhere from three to six
months for the DDTC to respond. More often than not, TAAs with
Russian entities are approved, but gaining approval is only the begin-
ning of a lengthy and difficult process.
When a TAA involving space hardware and Russia is approved, it
inevitably will include numerous pages of "provisos." These provisos
are requirements that companies must abide by, such as 24-hour mon-
itoring of all hardware, including the mandatory presence of U.S. Gov-
ernment officers during any "technical" conversations, etc.
Additionally, another proviso is to develop a Technology Transfer Con-
trol Plan ("TTCP"). Whereas the TAA is a broad, general document
outlining a collaboration, the TTCP is a much more specific, detailed
[Vol. 87:521
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plan describing the exact process for foreign interactions, security pro-
tocols, etc. Drafting and gaining approval for a TTCP can take an-
other two to four months. Finally, once a TTCP has been written and
accepted, then, assuming everyone involved has not died of natural
causes, technical communications can theoretically begin, although
more paperwork must be filed to obtain the relevant government
monitors for any dialogue per the requirements of the TTCP.
As described above, export control is a paper-intensive bureau-
cratic laden process that would make the IRS jealous, and in our case,
it led to some startling contrasts. For example, during an initial meet-
ing in Moscow with our launch provider, ISC Kosmotras, we were
most likely sitting across the table from former members of the Com-
munist Party. However, it was not the Russians, but us, American
citizens, who had not one, but two U.S. Government officers attending
the meeting and monitoring our every word. Certainly such a scenario
is the reverse of most people's perceptions of the two countries, yet it
was immediately quite evident that Russian aerospace companies and
their personnel are granted much more freedom than their U.S. coun-
terparts to participate in international programs. We, as Americans,
hold the U.S. out as the epitome of freedom and openness, yet it is the
U.S., not Russia, that muzzles its own citizens and hampers interna-
tional trade.
Even worse, U.S. firms are actually forced to pay for the privilege
of having government officials monitoring their activities, and it is not
cheap-monitors cost roughly $130 per hour for their time (and more
for overtime) plus the company must pay for all of their monitors'
travel and lodging expenses. As one might imagine, paying for two
monitors at $130 per hour can add up, particularly over the course of a
launch campaign which usually lasts three to four months. In 2006,
the year of the Genesis I campaign, Bigelow Aerospace paid the De-
partment of State a total of $223,208.10 just for export control review
and monitoring fees. In Soviet Russia, the KGB may have always
been watching, but at least they had the good courtesy to spy on you
for free.
Of course, the cost, time, and trouble of export control would all be
worthwhile if Bigelow Aerospace actually had any militarily sensitive
technology that was worth protecting. The problem was that we did
not, and hundreds of thousands of dollars, years of effort, and valuable
government resources were wasted monitoring systems that are not
nearly as sophisticated as what the Russians themselves produce.
Herein lies the fundamental flaw with the Department of State's en-
forcement of the ITAR-commonly available and well understood
space-related technologies should not and cannot be treated under




No one is against export control. There are numerous technologies
whose release to foreign nationals should require paperwork, scrutiny,
and monitoring. However, when no effort is made to distinguish sim-
ple, commercially available technology from militarily sensitive hard-
ware, this is where the system breaks down.
I cannot think of a better example of the irrationality and waste of
the ITAR than the treatment of a stand that Bigelow Aerospace built
to support the Genesis spacecraft. This "stand" made out of standard
aluminum, was basically circular in shape and had several legs stick-
ing out around the perimeter. Bottom-line, if you flipped the stand
upside down one would be hard pressed to distinguish the stand from
any other table located in your grandmother's kitchen. However,
since the stand had been "altered" to fit the spacecraft it was consid-
ered covered by the ITAR and, therefore, fell under a proviso in our
TAA that required 24/7 monitoring by a minimum security staff of
two.
One can only imagine the implications of the Russians obtaining
such sophisticated technology as could be garnered from our stand. If
sold to the Iranians, within weeks or months you could have members
of the Revolutionary Guard drinking coffee or even tea with the help
of this new "table" technology.
It took myself and my deputy two applications (general correspon-
dence letters) over the course of several months to get the monitoring
proviso waived for our stand.
Again, it is not that Bigelow Aerospace or anyone else in the en-
trepreneurial space field is against export control, but what we are
against is wasting time and resources guarding metal coffee tables.
Reforming the existing export control regime would actually help the
government's efforts to prevent the proliferation of sensitive technolo-
gies. If government personnel were able to spend more time on tech-
nologies that need protection and less on widely available commercial
hardware, everyone would benefit.
Export control is another area where the Russians and Ukrainians
have us beat. They too have sensitive technologies and military
secrets that they protect and do not disclose. However, the difference
between their approach and the U.S. system is that when it comes to
technologies that are decades old, well understood, and/or commer-
cially available, they are free to discuss such hardware without any
limitations whatsoever. This common sense approach is emblematic
of the Russian aerospace sector. There is an old story in the aerospace
community that NASA spent millions developing a high-tech "space
pen" that could function in orbit despite the lack of gravity, whereas
the Russians just used a pencil. Although this bit of space lore is more
myth than reality, it does accurately portray the dramatically differ-
ent ethos between the Russian and American space industries and
[Vol. 87:521
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their divergent approaches to export control. The Russians take a
practical approach, grounded in modern reality, whereas the U.S. po-
sition is based more on an obsolete ideology than pragmatism, reflect-
ing a fantasy world of absolute American technological hegemony that
has not existed for decades.
IV. REAPING WHAT WE SOW, THE DANGEROUS RESULTS
OF AN IRRATIONAL POLICY
In almost any real sense, America has lost the space race to the
Russians. America once held an international monopoly for commer-
cial space launch. Now, we have managed to go from being No. 1 to
having only one commercial space launch in 2006.6 Our domestic
launch companies have become so lazy and bloated that only the U.S.
Government can afford their services. If the government was to stop
purchasing U.S. rockets or open its contracts up to foreign competi-
tion, the American launch industry as we know it would most likely
cease to exist.
7
In stark contrast, the Russian Aerospace sector is booming. Rus-
sian rockets accounted for twelve commercial launches in 2007-more
than half of all commercial launches in the year, and double that of
their closest competitor, the European Arianne system, that was re-
sponsible for six commercial launches in 2007.8 Moreover, once the
Space Shuttle is retired in 2010 (assuming no major failures occur
prior to 2010 forcing the Shuttle to be taken out of service even ear-
lier), Russia and China will become the only two nations capable of
launching people into space.
How much America's backward export control regime has influ-
enced the U.S.'s downward spiral in commercial space launch is argu-
able, although it would be impossible to contend that it has not been a
contributing factor to today's dismal situation.9 However, where the
harm done by the ITAR is probably most keenly felt is in the U.S.
satellite manufacturing industry. Since all space hardware was
moved to the ITAR/the USML in 1999, the once dominant American
commsat manufacturing sector has seen its share of the global market
drop from a dominant eighty three percent to a soft fifty percentlo
European competitors such as Alcatel Alenia (which explicitly adver-
tises an "ITAR-Free" satellite) have doubled their market share while
6. Federal Aviation Administration, Historical Launch Data, http://www.faa.gov/
about/office org headquarters-offices/ast-launch data/historical-launch/ (last
visited July 25, 2008).
7. CSIS, supra note 1, at 7 ("Finding 3: The U.S. space industrial base is largely
dependent on the U.S. defense/national security budget.").
8. FUTRON, MONTHLY LAUNCH REPORT (Jan. 2008) (on file with author).




U.S. entities,11 and particularly small and medium sized businesses,
are withdrawing from international contracts. 12 In the meantime,
China, one of the primary countries that the ITAR was intended to
keep advanced space technology away from, has of course continued to
purchase state-of-the art hardware from European and Israeli suppli-
ers, costing U.S. companies as much as $3 billion in Chinese-related
business alone.13 In short, if the objectives of the 1998 export control
reforms expanding the ITAR were to cripple domestic U.S. capacity,
lose billions of dollars, and bolster European competition, all without
impacting Chinese capabilities, then we should rest assured that the
mission has been accomplished.
Not only does the ITAR as currently implemented have a signifi-
cant negative impact on the nation's commercial and economic inter-
ests, but it also fails in its primary goal to bolster national security. 14
By diminishing or outright eliminating America's space hardware
manufacturing capabilities, Department of Defense contractors be-
come more and more dependent on foreign systems and components.
This is why many national security experts are now advocating ITAR
reform. 15 Ironically, America's own export control regime has become
a significant threat to American security. If the stakes were not so
high, it would almost be laughable.
V. CONCLUSION: SIMPLE, COMMON SENSE REFORMS
Despite the importance and critical value of export control reform,
no sweeping legislation or Congressional action is necessary. Most, if
not all, of the vital issues can be addressed internally via unilateral
action by the Executive Branch. Below are several suggestions that
are all within the purview of the DDTC.
11. "By far the greatest benefactor to US export policies has been Alcatel Alenia
Space, a joint venture formed in 2005 by combining the space businesses of Al-
catel and Finmeccanica. In the early 2000s, Alcatel announced that they would
create an "ITAR-free" spacecraft. By 2004, Alcatel had been able to double their
market share from around 10% in 1998 to over 20% in 2004." Zelnio, supra note
3.
12. CSIS, supra note 1, at 10 ("Finding 11: Export controls are adversely affecting
U.S. companies' ability to compete for foreign space business, particularly in the
2nd and 3rd tier.").
13. See Zelnio, supra note 3.
14. CSIS, supra note 1, at 8 ("Finding 4: There are rapidly emerging foreign space
capabilities and the U.S. does not control their proliferation.... Finding 6: The
current export control policy has not prevented the rise of foreign space capabili-
ties and in some cases has encouraged it (ITAR-free space products).").
15. See e.g., Colin Clark, U.S. Eyes Removing Some Satellite Components from Muni-
tions List, SPACE NEWS, April 7, 2008, http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/
080407-busmon-satellite-remove.html; Eligar Sadeh, Viewpoint: Bureaucratic
Politics and the Case of Satellite Export Controls, 5 ASTROPOLITICS: THE INT'L J.
OF SPACE POL. & POL'Y 289 (2007).
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* Take the Time to Distinguish Benign, Commercially Available
Technologies from Potentially Militarily Sensitive Hardware:
All space hardware is not created equal. At first blush, the
DDTC treats all space systems as if they were exactly the same,
and this is a huge mistake. If a piece of space hardware, such
as a solar array, is widely and commercially available, it should
not be on the USML and should not be covered by the ITAR. At
the very least, provisos requiring 24/7 monitoring, TTCPs, etc.
should be dropped. In Bigelow Aerospace's case, the Interna-
tional Space Station itself is essentially under the auspices of
the Commerce Control List,16 which is why placing our less so-
phisticated, mostly off-the-shelf technology under the ITAR is
simply irrational.
* Enforce Hard Deadlines: At a minimum, some sort of deadlines
need to be enforced so that companies can depend on receiving
a response to their licensing requests in a regular and timely
fashion.
* Create a More Transparent and Responsive Licensing Process:
Currently, the licensing procedure at the DDTC (as opposed to
the much more open and responsive Defense Technology Secur-
ity Administration or "DTSA" Space Directorate) can be a bit of
a black box. More detail in regard to applications' timing and
status needs to be made available, and knowledgeable
ombudsmen should be employed to respond to applicants' ques-
tions and concerns.
" Lower or Eliminate Fees: Private sector companies, particularly
small businesses, that are already spending tens of millions of
dollars to innovate new technologies should not have to also
pay hundreds of thousand of dollars to the government for mon-
itoring services (this cost is in addition to the expense of em-
ploying whole offices of legal and support staff that companies
have to hire to deal exclusively with export control). Such costs
prevent many companies from participating in international
projects and stifles innovation. Fees should be based on a com-
pany's actual profit and capped at a much lower level if not
eliminated entirely.
Reforms based on these simple, common sense recommendations
would go far toward creating a more rational and productive export
control regime. If effective and expeditious reforms are implemented
soon, perhaps American preeminence in commercial space could some-
day become more than Science Fiction.
16. 15 C.F.R. §§ 734, 740, 742, 772, 774 (2008).
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